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PANEL DISCUSSION

CNW, CNC&S, NCC

REMARKS OF

VADM STANSFIELD TURNER
U.S. NAVY

President, Naval War College

31 August 1973

Navy Declassification/Release Instructions on File

VADM TURNER:

Gentlemen, I think ^{Phil did} ~~it's~~ a superb job amassing the history of this institution. ~~He~~ stopped, though, in 1972, when he and I arrived here. I don't know whether that's out of modesty or out of a respect that the historian can't cover territory that recent. I would like to fill in for you with respect to how your course fits into this continuum that Phil has described--attitudes and approaches to curriculum at the Naval War College. I think you deserve to see where we think the program that you're taking is a part of this overall continuum.

[The first thread in Phil's presentation, it seems to me, is a very vivid description of the vacillation, the pendulum swinging, that's gone on here over the years, between, on the one hand, the theoretical, the historical and the educational, but on the other hand, the practical, the contemporary, and the training.] And there's no question that we intend that your course come down hard on the side of Mahan and Sims and Spruance and Connolly, who fought hard battles to keep this into the theoretical and educational, and away from the day-to-day practical, administrative and planning work that lots of people in Washington would like to have us do.

I simply could not go before the Congress with good conscience and justify the considerable expense of this College on the grounds that it would serve you with a lot of contemporary data

on policies, programs, "buzzwords" and current rationale for what we're doing in our Strategy, in our Management, or Tactics. That kind of information is simply too perishable; and besides that, it's too easy to obtain.

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Admiral Connolly set up the entirely separate course, with a separate student body, that spent a whole year just on Logistics.

Your course is an attempted balance between these three strains of curriculum content that have prevailed here over the course of this College. We think that they are all important. Obviously, National Broad Strategy is, has been, and always will be, of vital importance to people like you and me. At the same time, you know, there are very few of us here who are really going to influence either Defense or National Strategy in its broadest sense. But we all want to have a concept of where we fit in in all the things that we do. But almost every one of you here--in fact I would say every one of you here--will influence,

in a large way in the rest of your career, many of the Management problems, the allocation of resources of the Defense Department or your agencies if you're not in the Defense Department.

And similarly, I feel that Tactics, because of the fast-changing technical situation, is something that merits the close attention of every military officer today. And perhaps, particularly in the Navy! And you who are not there, we'd like you to understand that one of the reasons we emphasize Tactics here is that, right or wrong, and I think probably wrong, we do not give our officers in their early careers, as broad a view of their career, of their profession, as do the Army and the Air Force and the Marine Corps. We lack a layer of education even, that exists in each of the other three Services, up to Captain, Marine Corps, Army Captain level. And so, we have a particular need for a lot of other reasons, to be sure that the Naval officers leave here--and I think it's equally valuable to those of you who are not in the Navy--with an understanding of all facets of submarine, surface, air, amphibious, and so on, of Naval Warfare. ~~But please not also, that~~

But please note also that there's a distinct thread that runs through these three elements of your course, that is, resource allocation. [In] Strategy you're allocating total resources--the economic, the diplomatic, the psychological--the military--resources of your country. [In] Management, you're allocating specific financial human resources to acquire the tools of the military trade. [In] Tactics, you're allocating

the resources that are available on the scene when you need to use them. So the thread of the thought process, the way we approach the principles of laying out problems, are the same in all three of the courses --the subcourses--that you'll take.

(E) A third theme in Phil's presentation, or a third part that I thought was particularly interesting, was his accounting that Admiral Connolly created a two-year course here in the mid-Fifties, and after he left, they took the first year of that course and made it the Command and Staff College, and made the second year College of Naval Warfare. A little different genesis then, from the Leavenworth and Montgomery Command and Staff courses, I believe.

In the years since that creation of a two-stage program, for right or wrong reasons--and again I think probably wrong--the Navy has only brought about 15% of the Command and Staff Naval Graduates of here or any other Command and Staff Course, back to the College of Naval Warfare. So in point of fact, there's 85% of the Naval Officers in the Senior Course here have not been to any Command and Staff, you can't build the Senior Course on the assumption that they've had the first year of Admiral Connolly's program. So the foundation was pulled out from underneath, the way the structure was built; inadvertently and perhaps incorrectly. But I had two choices in my mind: try to redo the whole system, or adapt the College to what in fact has happened--a more pragmatic approach.

We've taken the latter approach. We're working on the other also, but that's a long-term situation, as to how many officers the Navy can afford to send here at various stages of their career. So there's about an 80% overlap between Command and Staff and Naval Warfare courses here. I'm sure you've already perceived that ~~this~~^{there} is greater emphasis in Warfare on the Strategy phase of the curriculum and in Command and Staff, on the Tactics phase.

Now perhaps, for those of you who are Naval Command and Staff students, I would say this probably means there's a lesser chance that you will want to return here if this kind of program persists. But there's two reasons you might want to come back.

One is--particularly if you're fairly junior today, as a Command and Staff student, the curriculum will obviously change by the time you get to be a Senior Commander or Captain, and may be different enough, that it's perfectly worthwhile for you to come and take it up again--be updated.

And the other is, that here or subsequently you may develop special interest in one of these three fields that we teach. You may want to come back and take portions of the course that are new or different; and then probe into depth in some area through the Advanced Research Program--^{or} something like this--and do more independent work on your own. So there are lots of opportunities; and that'll be a very individual decision.

Finally, one other thread in ^{there appears} ~~Phil's talk~~, it seemed to me, ~~was~~ the dichotomy again between whether this program should be a rather highly structured academic routine, or whether it should be a broad exposure with a great opportunity for freedom to reflect and digest. ^{Today's} ~~Your~~ course comes down foursquare on the side of a structured, ordered routine. This comes from my personal belief that our profession today is too complex, too encompassing, for very many of us as individuals, to really have a broad enough perspective and appreciation of what we need to know to fill out our own experience, to broaden ourselves for the pattern of responsibility, the tough, difficult, uncertain decisions that have to be made; and too broad for us to really understand without a good bit of help, stimulation from the outside, what's the best way to go about filling in the gap that we have individually. So I think we need the order, the structure as it exists here, and I think that within it we are trying to create through your Term Papers, your Advanced Research Program, your NMAP Exercise, and a few other things, elements for individual expression and probing in depth into particular areas of interest.

Finally, before I turn over to the Department Heads and the Dean up here to throw in some other more specific details on your three courses and NMAP, I'd like to point out to you, as I did very briefly, I think, on Wednesday, some of the opportunities you have here in terms of your fellow ~~well I could point out~~ ~~Wednesday about the faculty, but now~~ fellow students.

Statistically in the Naval Warfare College there are 183 students this year. It's just about the same as last. Twenty-one of you in that College are civilians. This is the highest number of civilians we've ever had here in that College; and it's a deliberate effort on our part to increase the understanding, the dialogue between civilian elements of the Defense Department in the Navy Laboratories or--well, let me go down the list: Our Civilian students, twenty-one of them, represent the Department of Commerce, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the U.S. Information Agency, the Department of the Army, the Defense Mapping Agency, the Defense Communications Agency, the Defense Supply Agency, the National Security Agency, the Naval Materiel Command, then one of its subordinates, the Naval Air Systems Command, and 7 representatives of Navy Laboratories. Did I leave anybody out? I don't think so. I think that not only that the cross-communication here in both directions can be very profitable to all of us. There are 22 Army Officers, 16 Air Force Officers, 30 Marine Corps Officers and 1 Coast Guard Officer, plus 93 Naval Officers, representing a spread of expertise and some specialty within the Navy. We're happy, for instance, though, that of those civilians, the Defense Mapping Agency is represented here for the first time.

In Command and Staff there are 223 students. For the first time ever we have 5 civilian members, 4 of them representing Naval Materiel Command, the Naval Facilities Command, Electronic,

Supply and Ships Systems Commands; and 1 again representing Defense ^{Mapping} Supply Agency. There are 24 Army, 14 Air Force, 4 Coast Guard and 20 Marines, 156 Navy. In the Navy we have welcomed the first women students in Command and Staff, 3 Women Officers.

In our Naval Command College we have 31 students representing 31 countries including the United States. We're particularly happy to welcome Israel to this course, which is the first time that country has been represented on our campus.

In the Naval Staff Course, which is not with us here this morning there are 14 ~~students including the United States--14~~ countries, including United States. One of those, Ghana, is represented here for the first time. With Ghana and Israel we have had 51 countries represented on this campus over the 18 years we have been conducting international courses. I suggest to you that this is a broad, talented student body that we have here, and you have lots to gain by your seeking out people from the different walks that are represented here, and exploring and exchanging ideas. It's divergency of viewpoints, I think, that will make your course here particularly stimulating.

Warren, I'd like to ask you to say a few words about the general approach to the Management Program.

PROFESSOR WARREN ROGERS speaks, concluding with: "What we would hope you would get from the course is a means of structuring the information you have about a problem, in such a way that though honest men may differ, honest men will be speaking about the same thing."



Crowl stopped history when he & I arrived

How your curriculum fits in.

1. Vascillation -

Theoretical, historical, educational, practical,
contemporary, training

Down hard side

Mohan, Sims, Spruance, Connolly

I could not go before Congress and justify expense -

grounds filling you contemporary policies, programs,
our words *rational*
explanations -

Too perishable

Too easy acquired

2. 2nd Thread

Concentration broad strategy

Luce - Mahan

Focus on tactics of 1920's - 1930's

Plus interweaving of logistics or management periodically

Mohan - sense of totality resources

past maritime power

Connolly set up separate course - group students

studied nothing else

Attempted balance

Almost equal

Distinct - important

All resource allocation

3. C & S grew from 1st year Conolly 2 year course

Years since only 15% came from 2nd year

Impractical build one on other 80% overlap -

For C & S students - reduce likelihood return.

1. Time-change

2. Special work

Research

4. Finally - thread - whether highly structured,

academic routine, or broad exposure and opportunity

reflect and digest on own.

Come down four square on ordered routine.

Our profession too complex and to encompassing

very exceptional officer who has a broad enough

perspective to know where his background needs

filling in and how -

Friday Comments

Crowd Emphasis swung -
Broad strategy
Detailed tactics
Logistics / Management
interwoven interminably.

~~Last year~~

Program you will receive:

Effort at balance in
all of these

~~Return~~
Yesterday -

Changing problems, challenges
in each area

~~From~~

Not - call 3 resource
allocation problems

2

Key point - emphasis
not on facts learn -
on what you see
& understand about the
~~decision making~~
process.

That means you
must do thinking
& probing - no
right way to
make decisions

"Right" is "Best"

Recent reading,
writing and
individual effort -
~~take time~~

(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)

FRIDAY MEETING WITH STUDENTS

REEMPHASIZE

CONTENT - CONTEMPORARY DATA NOT IMPORTANT

SCHOOL SOLUTION - NO

COMPLAINTS - WRITING STYLE -

NOT INHERITED TRAIT

NOT INCONSEQUENTIAL

NOT FLOWERY OR BY DICTIONARY WORDS, BUT LUCID, TERSE

TO POINT -

NOT BECAUSE WE'RE ACACEMICS - BECAUSE I'VE

READ ENOUGH PENTAGON PROSE ALREADY

TAKE ADVANTAGE OF OPPORTUNITIES

CCL

VISITING LECTURERS

VISITORS

SEMINARS - DINNERS WITH VISITORS

QUESTIONING

DON'T BE AFRAID -

OPPORTUNITY

POLITE - GRUELLING

PRESIDENT'S HOURS

TOPICS

CLASS OFFICERS

①
SOCIAL

SEMINAR GROUPS

CLASS DINNER DANCES

(A)
WORKLOAD

HEAVY UNTIL REGAIN READING/STUDY HABITS

DON'T READ ALL 3

EXAMS WON'T ^{gone} ~~fill~~ YOU

②
HOPLITES -

FRIDAY COMMENTS

CROWL

EMPHASIS SWING -

BROAD STRATEGY

DETAILED TACTICS

LOGISTICS/MANAGEMENT INTERWOVEN INTERMITTENTLY

PROGRAM YOU WILL RECEIVE:

EFFORT AT BALANCE IN ALL OF THESE

YESTERDAY

CHANGING PROBLEMS CHALLENGES IN EACH AREA

NOTE - ALL 3 RESOURCE ALLOCATION PROBLEMS

KEY POINT - EMPHASIS NOT ON FACTS LEARN ON WHAT YOU SEE
AND UNDERSTAND ABOUT THE DECISION MAKING PROCESS.

THAT MEANS YOU MUST DO THINKING AND PROBING - NO

RIGHT WAY TO MAKE DECISIONS

"RIGHT" vs. "BEST"

ACCENT READING, WRITING AND INDIVIDUAL EFFORT

WORKLOAD

HEAVY UNTIL REGAIN READING/STUDY HABITS

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